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In many industrialized countries, the debate surrounding privatization is un-
dergoing significant changes. If during the 80’s and 90’s attention was placed 
on the sale of public enterprises to private operators, recent studies and prac-
tices have increasingly focused on cooperation and involvement of private en-
terprises in the process of distribution of public services (Bach, 1999; Montan-
heiro et al., 1998; Osborne, 2000). 
This work is based on the change from “competition” with the private sec-
tor to “cooperation” with it and - in particular - on the dynamics and charac-
teristics of the cooperation between public and private bodies. Furthermore, 
this work analyzes a specific type of public-private partnership, i.e. the compa-
nies for urban transformation established in Italy by municipalities and metro-
politan areas to plan and implement urban transformation measures. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In many industrialized countries, the debate surrounding privatization is un-
dergoing significant changes. If during the 80’s and 90’s attention was placed 
on the sale of public enterprises to private operators, current studies and 
practices have increasingly focused on cooperation and involvement of pri-
vate enterprises in the process of distribution of public services (Bach, 1999; 
Montanheiro et al., 1998; Osborne, 2000). 
This work is based on the change from “competition” with the private 
sector to “cooperation” with it and - in particular - on the dynamics and 
characteristics of the cooperation between public and private bodies. Fur-
thermore, this work analyzes a specific type of public-private partnership, i.e. 
the companies for urban transformation established in Italy by municipalities 
and metropolitan areas to plan and implement urban transformation meas-
ures.  
More specifically, this paper aims at understanding how and to what ex-
tent the above-mentioned companies contribute to regenerating the territory 
in which they operate. Thus, we have tried to analyze: a) the real interest of 
the private bodies in participating in the project, an interest which appears to 
be at least theoretically significant due to the connection between urban re-
generation projects, real estate and commercial development of the area; b) 
real influence of the public administration on the entire project, an influence 
that should be – in theory – based on coordination and control. 
This paper is structured as follows: the first paragraph analyzes the con-
cept of public-private partnership – now a widely diffused concept both in lit-
erature and in everyday language, however not associated to a clearly defined 
and precise meaning; the second paragraph introduces the topic of urban re-
generation, particularly through an international literature review. The third 
paragraph combines the issues of PPP and urban regeneration within the Ital-
ian contest: this leads to identify urban transformation companies (UTC) as 
public-private partnership modalities chosen by the Italian legislator to im-
plement urban regeneration processes. Through qualitative multiple case study 
analysis, the fourth paragraph examines six UTCs, investigating the ownership 
structure, relations among members and benefits or limits registered in the re-
generation process. The conclusion of this paper contains considerations on 
the results of the study and provides new stimulus to future research.  
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2.  Private-public partnership: defining aspects 
 
The term “public-private partnership” (PPP) is generally used with reference 
to any type of operational agreement based on mutual commitments and re-
sponsibilities between public bodies and partners that operate outside the 
public sectors. The lack of a precise definition seems to have arisen on the 
one hand from the fact that in general - in the last twenty years - the termi-
nology used to indicate the private sector’s involvement in distributing public 
services has become more complex, varied and open to different interpreta-
tions, even ideological ones; on the other hand, from the use, in particular, of 
similar acronyms in different countries that however imply different proc-
esses
2. 
The term is also not defined at Community level either. In this case, the 
term is used for “forms of cooperation between public authorities and the 
world of business which aim at ensuring the funding, construction, renova-
tion, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a 
service” (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). 
In particular, the European Community makes a distinction between: 
 
•  PPPs of purely contractual nature, in which the partnership between the  
public and the private sector is based solely on contractual links,  
•  PPPs of institutional nature, involving cooperation between the public 
and the private sector within a distinct entity. 
 
The following elements normally characterise PPPs (European Commission, 
2004, p. 3): 
 
•  The relatively long duration of the relationship. 
•  The  method  of  funding  the  project,  in  part  from  the  private  sector, 




2 “This term differs greatly within a single country, never mind between countries and be-
tween public management systems and business systems” (Bovaird, 2004: 213). In addition 
to the technical-operational differences, at continental level, there are small legislative diver-
sities regarding the procedure for assigning contracts or the relative regulations for creating 
planning companies.                                      Public-Private Partnership for Urban Regeneration        5 
Nonetheless, public funds - in some cases rather substantial - may be added 
to the private funds. 
•  The important role of the economic operator, who participates at differ-
ent stages to the project (design, build, management, funding). 
•  The  distribution  of  risks  between  the  public  and  private  partner,  to 
whom the risks generally borne by the public sector are transferred.  
 
In view of the above, this paper is primarily interested in understanding the 
underlying reason for the broad diffusion of this tool, more than understand-
ing the terminology issue.  
Various factors explain the increased recourse to PPPs. In view of the 
budget constraints confronting Member States, it meets a need for private 
funding in the public sector. Another explanation is the desire to benefit 
more in public life from the know-how and working methods of the private 
sector. The development of the PPP is also part of the more general change 
in the role of the State in the economy, moving from a role of direct opera-
tor to one of organiser, regulator and controller. This paper will discuss at 
length on the first motivations, while on the last one it is necessary to imme-
diately express certain considerations aimed at interpreting the changes un-
derway in the public administration in light of the two new “paradigms”: 
New Public Management and Public Governance.  
Even if it is impossible to precisely define the NPM 
3, the principal pur-
pose of the reforms that fall under this name is “fostering a performance-oriented 
culture in a less centralized public sector” (OECD, 1995). The key words of the 
movement, linked among each other, are therefore “do more with less” and 
“steering instead of rowing”
4.  
________________ 
3 This term implies “a new paradigm for public management” that is based on “greater em-
phasis on results and on value for money, delegating on the part of the authorities and increas-
ing flexibility, responsibility and control, focusing on the customer and the service, strength-
ening strategic capabilities, introducing competition and other elements that are part of the 
market, changing relations with other government levels” (OECD, 1995, p.37). Moreover, 
Annessi (2002) defines the NPM’s three principal components: “the redefinition of bounda-
ries between the state and the market; the reshaping of the public sector’s macrostructure; 
the redefinition of the operational rule according to which the public sector performs its 
functions and pursues its objectives”. For more details on the movement’s principal charac-
teristics see., among others,, Rhodes,  1996; Pollitt, 1990;  Hood, 1991, 1995; Ferlie et al, 
1996; Meneguzzo, 2000. 
4 “Governments that focus on steering activity shape their communities, and nations. They 
make more policy decisions. They put more social and economic institutions in motion. 
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Specifically, through privatization, contracting-out and agencies, NPM tends to 
define a new structure of relations between the public and private world. 
Substantially, it is based on the idea that the public operator must carry out a 
commissioning role, while production must be transferred to the organiza-
tion(s) – public, but autonomous, private or non profit – that better guaran-
tee(s) the requested output and outcome objectives. The results are: 1. a net 
division between political decisions (steering) and production and distribution 
of the service (rowing)
5; 2. the possibility of creating competition among pos-
sible suppliers to achieve increasing quality, flexibility and collective satisfac-
tion. Therefore, NPM introduces the principles of “quasi-market” in the dis-
tribution of public services. 
The problem that has emerged over the years with the implementation of 
the above-mentioned processes (in particular with contracting out which has of-
ten been identified as the focal element of the reform process) lies in the fact 
that: a) it is not always possible to precisely and clearly define the expected 
social output and outcome objectives; b) the public body does not always 
have the necessary skills for programming, monitoring and assessing the per-
formance of the private distributors, to create incentives and clear mecha-
nisms against opportunistic behavior, as well as for entirely controlling the 
public processes that are now fragmented. In conclusion, contracting out 
seems to be an appropriate solution only for certain types of services, i.e. the 
so-called simple ones (for example, waste collection). 
Recognizing these difficulties leads to a new way of approaching complex 
problems which are the ones now being faced by the public administration: 
no  longer  entirely  empowering  the  private  body  but  trying  to  reach  the 
jointly established goals, accepting the dependence and interaction that exists 




Some even do more regulating. Rather than hiring more public employees, they make sure 
other institutions are delivering services and meeting the community’s need” (Osborn, Gae-
bler, 1992, p. 32). 
5 “The separation of steering and rowing) allows (governments) to use competition between service 
providers. It preserves maximum  flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and  it 
helps them insist on accountability for quality performance: contractors know they can be let 
go if their quality sags; civil servant know they cannot” (Osborne, Gaeber, 1992, p.35). 
6 Rhodes states (1997: xv) “Messy problems demand messy solutions” which leads the pub-
lic administrations to reorganize themselves establishing lateral, diagonal and vertical rela-
tions with other organizations.                                      Public-Private Partnership for Urban Regeneration        7 
Within this new vision, the public administration is not placed “above” the 
citizens, private profit and non profit organizations, but it is placed “next” to 
them through “horizontal types of steering” (Koppenjan, Klijn, 2004: 108): 
cooperation between public and private bodies, promotion and improvement 
of all self-organized types of civil society and of the initiatives undertaken by 
various different players represent the innovative government and coordina-
tion modalities for the socio-economic systems of the new paradigm.  
Also in this case problems and limitations exist: if what Kickert says is true 
(1993, p. 201), i.e. that networking must not be interpreted as a source of 
“problems and difficulties which have to be mastered, but as sources of in-
novation”,  a  critical  success  factor  is  the  capability  to  manage  relations 
among multiple players with different objectives and that can limit the effec-
tiveness of cooperation. This role must often be carried out by the public 
operator whose capabilities in this sense still seem limited
7. 
The competition/collaboration dichotomy is, therefore, useful to under-
stand the changes currently taking place in the public service, but the “reality 
is more complex and subtle” (Lowndes, Skelcher, 1998, 318). For this rea-
son, the change in the public sector can be studied through the analysis of 
the forms of social coordination – in other words of governance
8.  
________________ 
7 Having a role in the PPP involves increased complexities for the public operator “which 
has to wear a number of different ‘hats’. As managers of contractual relationships, public 
bodies:  authorise  contracts  (government  as  concession  grantor);  evaluate  infrastructural 
needs (government as network planner); provide supporting facilities (e.g. land) and pay for 
services (government funding); define performance outcomes and standards (government as 
customer); undertake detailed procurement planning (government as project manager); en-
sure facilities are constructed, used and maintained satisfactorily (government as inspector); 
require  compliance  with  standards  and  specifications  (government  as  overseer);  monitor 
business and financial viability (government as contract manager); assess environmental im-
pacts (government as protector of the environment); and guarantee community access and 
achieve social policy objectives (government as representative of the public interest)” (Grim-
sey, Lewis, 2004: 94).   
8 An arrangement of governance concept is made by Kooiman (1999): 
1.  governance as the minimal state where governance becomes a term for redefining the extent 
and for of public intervention (Gray, 1994; Rhodes, 1994); 
2.  corporate governance, which refers to the way big organizations are directed and con-
trolled (Hilmer, 1993; Charkham, 1994; Tricker, 1994); 
3.  governance as New Public Management making a difference between government and govern-
ance (…) (Osborne, Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1997); 
4.  governance  as  advocated  by  the  World  Bank  under  the  heading  of  “good  governance” 
(World Bank, 1989; …); 
5.  governance as socio-cybernetic governance. 
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In  particular,  we  can  identify:  hierarchy  governance,  market  governance, 
network governance (Table 1). 
“PPPs should not be confused with the network as a mode of governance. 
Neither is there a necessary correspondence between the two…they have a 
particular  affinity  with  network  modes  of  governance,  but  –  at  different 
stages of the partnership life cycle – hierarchical and market relationships 
also assume importance” (Lowndes, Skelcher, 1998, 320)
9.  
In view of the above, we have analysed the regeneration theme, a contest 
in which PPPs seem the most appropriate organizational form. 
 
3.  Urban regeneration: notes 
 
Urban regeneration can be defined as “a comprehensive and integrated vi-
sion and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and seeks to 
bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and envi-
ronmental conditions of an area that has been subject to change” (Roberts, 
2000: 17)
10. 
In the past twenty years, extensive literature has been developed on this 
topic, particularly of Anglo-Saxon origin that substantially identifies the main 
transformation factor of the economic geography of entire urban regions in 
the decline of large industries. Consequently, there is a need for a radical 
change in the approach to urban policies. 
This change can be understood by analyzing the following table (Table 2) 
that refers to the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries and that summarizes 
the principal elements of the phases that have characterized urban develop-
ment. 
_________________ 
6.  governance as self-organizing networks, as Rhodes (1997, p.15): “self-organizing, inter-
organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of 
the game and significant autonomy from the state”. 
9 “The loyalty, trust and reciprocity which characterize the ideal typical network mode of 
governance may not always be appropriate due to the variety of tasks required by a multi-
organizational  partnership”  (Lowndes,  Skelcher,  1998,  219-320).  It  is  possible  in  fact  to 
study the stages of the development of the PPP and reach the conclusion that in different 
phases of the life cycle of the PPP we can find different modes of governance. It is however 
true that normally “the network mode of governance has a continuing importance as the 
sub-structure of successful partnerships” (Lowndes, Skelcher, 1998, 320). 
10 Literature contains a myriad of definitions for urban regeneration cfr., for example, Linch-
field, 1992: 19; Hausner, 1993: 526; Donnison, 1993: 18. The definition proposed in this 
work appears to be the most exhaustive.                                      Public-Private Partnership for Urban Regeneration        9 
Urban regeneration should, at least (Roberts, 2000: 18): 
 
•  “be based upon a detailed analysis of the condition of an urban area; 
•  be aimed at the simultaneous adaptation of the physical fabric, social struc-
tures, economic base and environmental condition of an urban area; 
•  attempt to achieve this task of simultaneous adaptation through the gen-
eration and implementation of a comprehensive and integrated strategy; 
•  make the best possible use of natural, economic, human and other re-
sources, including land and existing features of the built environments; 
•  seek to ensure consensus through the fullest possible participation and 
co-operation of all stakeholders with a legitimate interest in the regenera-
tion of an urban area”. 
 
In order to address the interconnected problems facing many urban areas we 
need  to  have  “a  strategically  designed,  locally  based,  multi-sector,  multi-
agency partnership approach” (Carter, 2000: 37; Mackintosh, 1992; Bailey et 
al., 1994; Lowndes, Skelcher, 1998; Purdue, 2001; McWilliams, 2004, Hem-
phill, McGreal, Berry, Watson, 2006). 
In relation to the urban regeneration context, Mackintosh (1992: 210) de-
vises three main conceptual model of partnership: 
 
1.  the  synergy  model  suggests  that  by  combining  their  knowledge,  re-
sources, approaches and operational cultures, the partners will be able to 
achieve more together than they would be by working on their own; 
2.  the budget enlargement model is based upon the idea that by working 
together partners will gain access to additional funds; 
3.  the transformational model suggests that there are benefits to be gained 
by exposing the different partners to the assumption and working meth-
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4.    Urban regeneration in Italy and urban 
 transformation companies as a public-private  
 partnership model 
 
Italy presents a public-private partnership market among the most developed 
in Europe, both for number of projects as well as for economic value of ac-
tivity (National Observatory on Project Financing, 2005)
11. 
With reference to possible PPP examples - among the most widespread 
and regulated by our laws - we would like to point out the following (Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants, 2005): 
 
1.  Project Finance, regulated by article 37 bis of law 109/94: the private 
sector can act as a “promoter” of public works by submitting to the pub-
lic administration a specific infrastructural project for activities that are 
part of the administration’s three-year investment program.   
2.  The concessions for building and management, through which the public 
administration commissions another body with the building of an infra-
structure that is functional to the management of a public service.  
3.  The other management concessions; this type of PPP is often used for 
the distribution of public services through already existing infrastructures 
(for example, hydraulic networks and systems, gas, public lighting, votive 
lighting, etc.). 
4.  The mixed public-private companies introduced in the national system 
by art. 22 of Law 142/1990, as a possible method to manage local public 
services. 
5.  The urban transformation companies (UTC) that are differentiated from 
other mixed public-private companies due to the bond represented by 
the company’s objective.  
6.  Public sponsorship. 
 
In order to fully understand this phenomenon, reference should be made to 
tables 3 and 4 that highlight each of the above-mentioned typologies. 
________________ 
11 The National Observatory on Project Financing is promoted by the Ministry of Econom-
ics and Finance, by the Unità Tecnica Finanza di Progetto - CIPE, by Unioncamere and by 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Rome  and  carried  out  by  AeT  in  collaboration  with 
CRESME and Tecnocons. 
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In particular, the analysis of the tables indicates how in the past 4 years the 
PPP growth in Italy has been progressive and significant: in fact, between 
2002 and 2005 initiatives grew by 65% showing also an increase in value 
(+80%). 
A growth trend can be observed in all typologies and mostly in the “other 
procedures”  category,  especially  for  what  concerns  urban  transformation 
companies aimed at planning and implementing urban transformation meas-
ures. 
With regard to the latter, it is possible to say that such measures have 
been initiated in Italy with a twenty years delay with respect to other Euro-
pean countries. Their start seems to be linked to at least three factors: 
 
1.  macro-economic changes in the territory also based on the greater focus 
of the economy on services; 
2.  new role and new awareness of the local bodies in urban management;  
3.  recovery of the real estate market. 
 
With regard to the first profile, in recent years, Italian cities have been char-
acterized by a strong need for redevelopment initiatives and measures aimed 
at, for example, converting for other uses the abandoned industrial areas, the 
result of social and economic crisis, restructuring densely populated urban 
areas (residential areas or illegal urban areas), recovering deteriorated areas, 
improving railroad junctions and making them functional in those areas of 
social and urban alienation, rationalizing urban areas that have been devel-
oped in a disorderly and diverse way (for example in mixed industrial, com-
mercial and residential areas), improving transit in residential areas (through 
new  spaces  and  services:  public  parks,  sports  facilities,  meeting  centers, 
schools, kindergartens, etc.) or of areas intended for commercial purposes, 
etc. In this sense, our country is not different from others that for some time 
have  already  undertaken  important  urban regeneration  initiatives  (Nelson, 
2001, Nijkamp, van der Burch, Vindigni, 2002, Verhage, 2003; 2005; Ball, 
Maginn, 2005; Van Boxmeer, Van Beckhoven, 2005) aimed at - as previously 
analyzed - not only the urban-building growth of the territory, but also at so-
cio-economic growth.   
With regard to the second profile, it is important to point out that local 
bodies have shown a renewed interest for urban transformation processes 
strictly connected to the next collective needs: in the 60’s and 70’s, the objec-
tives  shared  by  local  bodies  were  to  build  the  basic  collective  structures, 
guarantee housing, create commerce and employment through productive 12    S. POGGESI 
 
structures. At the end of the 1980’s, these socio-economic objectives under-
went a profound change (safety, social unity pursuable also through urban 
redevelopment processes). This was connected to a strong reduction of eco-
nomic-financial resources and the large financial investments made for urban 
transformation. For these reasons, the strong interest for the regeneration 
process seems to be connected to two objectives: in addition to meeting the 
new collective needs and consequently the needs of the electorate, through 
urban regeneration the local body can obtain positive economic results to be 
re-invested in new projects of public interest, or in the distribution of other 
services.  With regard to the third profile, the principal research centers for 
the real estate sector highlight how from 2000 to 2005 there was a growth 
trend both in the number of real estate sold and in prices (Tables 5 and 6). 
With regard to the residential sector, the Agenzia del Territorio, elaborat-
ing data held by the Ministry of Interior, obtained an estimate of the sales 
relative to the 1985-2005 period (Table 7).  
The table shows that the growth in the sales volume began in 1997 with an 
increase of over 66% in the past eight years. The cost trend for the 2001-
2005 period also registered a growth (Table 8). 
The forecast for 2006 (Nomisma, 2006) indicates the persistence of a 
positive trend in costs, even if with some signs of a drop, as already regis-
tered during 2005.  
This trend of the real estate market reveals the strategic connection exist-
ing  between  urban  regeneration  projects  and  projects  for  real  estate  and 
commercial development and consequently, the strong private interest in this 
process.   
In addition to the above factors, there is also the development of the ur-
ban discipline that has introduced new tools. In line with the defined theo-
retical concept, these tools are inspired by a governance philosophy of the 
territory based on the separate definitions of strategic objectives and man-
agement of transformation processes.  
The urban transformation companies (UTS) are placed into this frame-
work. They represent a new type of public-private collaboration that joins 
public interest for development and redevelopment of the territory, with the 
experience and entrepreneurship of private bodies
12. 
UTSs were introduced in our system by art. 17, paragraph 59 of Law n. 
127/1997, fully included in article 120 of the new consolidated act of local 
________________ 
12 These companies are inspired by the French Societes mixtèe d’amènagement urban (SEM) 
(De Lucia, 2004).                                     Public-Private Partnership for Urban Regeneration        13 
associations of 2000, later modified by art. 44 of Law 166/2002, and partially 
interpreted in the Announcement of the Ministry of Public Works dated 
November 11, 2000. 
According to the provisions established by the law “UTSs are established 
as PLCs by municipalities and metropolitan areas to plan and implement ur-
ban transformation measures in compliance with existing urban regulations. 
For this purpose, the resolutions must in any case establish that the private 
shareholders of the companies are chosen through public procedures”. 
Some aspects are of particular interest, specifically: 
 
•  the necessary existence of a public body that is the promoter of the ini-
tiative; 
•  the indication of a corporate purpose; 
•  the nature of a mixed company. 
 
With regard to the existence of a promoting public body, the law is exhaus-
tive: metropolitan cities and municipalities are the protagonists of the initia-
tives and are responsible for elaborating and adopting urban plans, as well as 
any other program and legal document. Within this context, the UTS repre-
sents an “operational urban tool” for implementing and carrying out urban 
initiatives.   
With regard to the corporate purpose, this concerns the planning of ur-
ban  transformation  initiatives,  the  realization  of  the  transformation  (with 
prior purchasing of the real estate undergoing transformation) as well as the 
marketing of the results. The UTS can directly carry out activities by using 
external contractors chosen through public tenders maintaining, however, 
the legal responsibility of the activity as sole partner of the local administra-
tion.  
With regard to the mixed company, this seems to have been chosen by 
legislators to avoid the bureaucratic, administrative and management proce-
dures typical of a direct management as well as to involve private economic 
resources  in  the  urban  transformation  process  (Dugato,  1999).  The  local 
body therefore has the task of: 1) identifying the corporate capital share to 
attribute to the private partner(s) on the basis of the UTS’aim as well as of 
the specific characteristics of the transformation initiatives to be carried out; 
2) choosing the type of private partner, coherently with the objectives set by 
the UTS (Table 9). The latter appears to be of significant interest; private 
partners, in fact, can be grouped into three different categories: 
 14    S. POGGESI 
 
1.  pure investors, namely, those bodies interested in the investment poten-
tial and in the programmed performance. This category includes real es-
tate funds, retirement funds, insurance companies, credit institutions, 
etc.; 
2.  final users, namely those bodies that draw profit not only from pure in-
vestments, but also from the management of the real estate (manage-
ment of shopping centers, restaurants, parking lots, etc.); 
3.  providers of global services, namely, those bodies that are part of the 
improvement process with the purpose of reaching specific objectives 
within the entire transformation procedure (electricity suppliers, cater-
ing, cleaning, security, builders, etc). 
 
The choice depends on the UTS’s role and on its relation with the market. In 
any case, “the UTS’s private member must play an active and direct role in 
the implementation and management of the redevelopment process” (An-
nouncement of the Ministry of the Public Works). In particular, the UTS’s 
private member must be capable of providing, in addition to the traditional 
services of the building sector, also long-term integrated services with the 
supply of models for optimizing management of real estate over time, along 
with the necessary financial services. 
In this context, the UTCs are not substantially different from other PLCs 
established by local bodies, except for the specificity of the corporate pur-
pose and the consequent operative modalities. In particular, the use of a 
UTC allows local bodies to: 
•  carry out initiatives of significant public interest, managing them more 
effectively with respect to other modalities; 
•  find additional specific technical and management resources; 
•  find financial resources that allow carrying out investment volumes that 
are much higher with respect to the financial availability of the actual 
body;  
•  maintain unaltered its control characteristics connected with the exercise 
of urban authority. 
 
The partnership with the local promoting body allows private bodies, poten-
tial members or financers of a UTC (entrepreneurs, investors, owners of real 
estate property to be transformed) to: 
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•  participate in an innovative process of significant importance and visibility 
with positive consequences in terms of image and marketing; 
•  initiate a stable form of collaboration with the public body capable of im-
proving the efficiency of administrative procedures; 
•  participate in promoting a project through a company that has a consider-
able influence within the capital market also thanks to a role that guaran-
tees the public body, while in the presence of an initially limited capitaliza-
tion; 
•  obtain economic-financial benefits. 
 
5.    Empirical analysis 
 
The methods, the ownership structures and relations among UTC members 
and the Stu Pasubio case follow. 
 
5.1.  Methods 
 
The empirical analysis, finalized at understanding relations between public 
bodies and private operators in UTCs that are active in the urban regenera-
tion process, was conducted with specific reference to the companies associ-
ated with A.STU.R., the association of Urban Transformation Companies 
and for the Redevelopment of Cities (Associazione delle Società di Trasformazione 
Urbana e per la Riqualificazione della città) that “pursues the objective of coordi-
nating, standardizing and developing the activity of the Urban Transforma-
tion Companies in compliance with the provisions of art. 120 of Law Decree 
n. 267/2000, as well as with other public-private partnership bodies operat-
ing within the urban redevelopment/transformation area” (Astur statute, art. 
1). 
Specifically, the companies being considered are the founding members 
of the Association: 
 
1.  Bagnolifutura Spa in Napoli,  
2.  Città Giovani e Innovazione Spa,  
3.  Porta Sud Spa,  
4.  Pianoro Centro Spa,  
5.  Via Nuova Trento Spa,  
6.  Osservanza S.r.l,  
7.  Stu Pasubio. 16    S. POGGESI 
 
Porta Sud SpA does not actually qualify as a UTC, but rather as a holding 
company that is planning to establish one or more UTCs for redeveloping the 
southern area of the train station in Bergamo. Consequently, research that 
was conducted, according to the method of comparative case studies, focusing on 
6 companies that were established after 1997. 
The choice of analyzing these 6 UTCs derives from two reasons: 
 
1.  by forming an association, these companies guarantee the legitimacy and 
the promotion at national level of the urban transformation company’s 
tools.   
2.  UTCs operating in our country are not many more than the ones listed 
above. 
 
The case study analysis was conducted using two methods: desk and on field. 
Information was collected primarily by consulting available literature on the 
topic, public documents and materials, data bases, conferences and publica-
tions of each administration to present and promote its initiative. Special at-
tention was devoted to the Statutes and the parasocial Agreements (wherever 
present),  insofar  fundamental  documents  for  understanding  the  laws  that 
regulate relations between “public” and “private” members. The results of 
such studies were subsequently integrated by information collected through 
questionnaires that were followed by semi-structured interviews (Table 9). 
Important aspects that were analyzed, both in the interview with question-
naires as well as in the semi-structured interview, were: 
 
1.  ownership structure and relations among members; 
2.  benefits from the PPP for urban regeneration, focusing advantages and 
disadvantages deriving from the experience of public and private opera-
tors. 
 
Hereafter, we offer a concise overview of the six case studies
13. 
 
Napoli: Bagnolifutura Spa 
The priority objective of the transformation process is the recovery of a 
former  metallurgic  plant,  Italsider,  where  obvious  environmental  impact 
problems have been registered.  
________________ 
13 Information in this paragraph was drawn from the Astur documents and from the web-
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Salerno: Città Giovani e Innovazione Spa 
The project aims at building an office services centre, for residences and fa-
cilities strictly connected with the establishment of the University of Salerno. 
 
Macerata: Via Nuova Trento Spa 
The project aims at redeveloping the area of “via Trento” also due to the 
need to rebuild, on the right side of the road, the only building there was be-
fore and that was demolished following the 1997 earthquake. 
 
Imola: Osservanza S.r.l. 
The project aims at recovering the former Hospital Osservanza, adjacent to 
Imola’s historical centre. 
 
Pianoro (Province of Bologna): Pianoro Centro Spa  
The project aims at redeveloping the centre of Pianoro by constructing new 
buildings and attempting to solve the “housing” issue.  
 
 
Parma: Stu Pasubio 
The  urban  transformation  project  aims  at  meeting  the new  needs  of the 
Pasubio area, an industrial district of Parma at the beginning of the last cen-
tury and currently used as a residential area. 
 
5.2. The ownership structures and relations among UTC 
members 
 
The above-mentioned urban transformation processes are implemented by 
urban transformation companies. With respect to this analysis, it is worth of 
analysis the formation/variation of the corporate capital, the modalities for 
choosing private partners and their characteristics.   
 
Nuova Via Trento Spa (Macerata) was established in August 2001. The corpo-
rate capital, € 5.861.708,04, is split up as follows:  
Macerata Municipality: 20% 
Banks: 10% 
Private operators: 70% 
There are not external funds. 
 18    S. POGGESI 
 
Pianoro Centro SpA (Bologna) was established on 19 May 2004 by Pianoro Mu-
nicipality and ACER Bologna. The corporate capital, € 12.967.000, is split up 
as follows: 
Pianoro Municipality: 73,62 %  
ACER Bologna: 8,89 % 
Private operators: 17,49%. They are two companies that were included in the 
capital share on 16.09.2005  
External funds: € 2.663.870,83. by Emilia-Romagna Region. 
 
Osservanza s.r.l. (Imola) 
The corporate capital is split up as follows: 
Imola Municipality:51%  
Con.Ami: 49% 
External funds: € 6.500.000 by Emilia-Romangna Region and € 5.000.000 by 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Imola. 
 
STU Pasubio (Parma) was established on 5 September 2002.  
The corporate capital, € 1.200.000, is split up as follows: 
Parma Municipality: 52%  
Private operators: 48%  
External  founds:  €  2.079.771,93  by  Emilia-Romagna  Region  and  € 
6.155.955,62 by Parma Municipality. 
 
Bagnolifutura SpA (Napoli) was established on 24 April 2002.  
The corporate capital, € 62.300.000, is split up as follows: 
Napoli Municipality: 90%,  
Campania Region: 7,5% 
Napoli Città Metropolitana Province: 2,5%.  
External funds: € 75.000.000. 
 
Città dei Giovani e dell’Innovazione (Comune di Baronissi) 
The corporate capital, € 120.000,00, is split up as follows: 
Baronissi Municipality: 95%  
Salerno Province: 5% 
 
Data can be summarized as follows in Table 10. The table 10 shows how 
only one of the analyzed companies holds private majority capital, namely 
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It is also interesting to note how the fractioning of the ownership, traceable 
to the presence of various other bodies different from the local bodies (18 
private companies, 3 credit institutions, 5 physical persons), joined to the 
capital share held by the latter, could determine a significant concentration of 
power of the public body(ies).  
The remaining part of the population presents total or majority public 
capital. Among the various reasons, the one primarily referred to is based on 
the particular importance of protecting collective interests that the majority 
presence of the municipality guarantees to the urban regeneration process. In 
this sense, one can “read” the corporate governance systems of companies as be-
ing strictly influenced by the public body, as also in the case of the new “via 
Trento”, where the President, who is also the CEO in 3 cases out of 6, is ap-
pointed by the municipality.  
The changes that occurred in the corporate capital over the course of time 
are also interesting.  They concern both the total capital as well as its forma-
tion and division among members.  
The reason for this latter type of change (quite common) can be traced 
back to the need of the local administrations to attribute a particular “mark” 
on the company management (consequently, the municipalities tend to estab-
lish companies with a strong role of the local public capital) to then leave 
room for the increasingly important role played by private partners who are 
also potentially attracted by the economic returns on their investment. In this 
sense, the transfer of shares held by the public body hardly ever occurs, 
while the reduction of the public share through an increase in the private 
capital is quite common.  
Furthermore, wherever present, the private body is chosen through a 
public  tender.  This  procedure  allows  to  create  a  competitive  situation 
among those bodies interested in joining the company structure. The excep-
tion is represented by Pasubio, which accepted private bodies becoming 
part of the UTC through the transfer of their real estate property, without a 
selection made through a public bid.   
With regard to the types of other partners, data indicates that Pianoro, 
Pasubio and Nuova via Trento have partners with appropriate technical-
professional capabilities in the sectors where the UTC operates, as well as 
appropriate financial capabilities. Even in the case of entirely public compa-
nies, since the final objective however remains that of creating a PPP, expe-
rience in the construction sector and in real estate appears to be the most 
desirable aspects (for example, in the case of Osservanza srl).  20    S. POGGESI 
 
The relations between private and public members can be defined as “based 
on mutual trust”, even in, as underlined in all the interviews, fully respecting 
the different roles. The key role played by the public body and its influence 
on the company management is recognized as the need to exploit the pri-
vate bodies’ commercial credibility to accomplish the regeneration project. 
At the same time, there are also advantages for the private body: by partici-
pating in the UTC, there is the possibility to be part of an ambitious project 
that often involves specific areas of the city, exploiting the financial credibil-
ity of the public body as well as external public funding.  
To better understand the advantages and disadvantages of participating 
in an urban regeneration project, it is necessary to study the case of STU 
Pasubio.   
 
5.3. The Stu Pasubio case 
 
The decision to examine the Stu Pasubio case was based on two variables: 
   
1.  the presence, within the company, of private partners: 48% of Stu Pasu-
bio’s capital is owned by private bodies; 
2.  the importance of the regeneration process: the area undergoing trans-
formation regards an entire section of the city. 
 
Using these two variables, Osservanza, Bagnolifutura, Città dei Giovani e 
dell’Innovazione have been left out because of total public capital; Nuova 
Via Trento has been left out because its project is on a limited urban trans-
formation; Pianoro Centro has been left out because of the low presence of 
private bodies within the company (17,49%). 
According to its Statute, Stu Pasubio provides: 
 
•  for purchasing areas and real estate involved in the redevelopment ini-
tiatives according to the modalities established by the laws currently into 
force; 
•  for planning and carrying out the urban generation initiatives of the 
“Pasubio” area”; 
•  for the marketing and management of buildings, as well as of works and 
infrastructures. 
 
Specifically, the preliminary and definitive planning of public works envis-
aged in the urban regeneration program will be carried out by the municipal-                                    Public-Private Partnership for Urban Regeneration        21 
ity; the planning of the private works intended for commercial purposes will 
be carried out by the company that, therefore, corresponds to a UTC.  
With regard to the company’s operation, the UTC applies the regulation 
for public works only for public works, guaranteeing flexibility and speed in 
the execution of works to be marketed in a free market.   
Private members and the municipality must transfer the real estate they 
own to the company. In the face of the transfer, the company is also obliged 
to transfer:  a)  to  the municipality  the public  residential  real  estate  surface 
within the urban redevelopment program; b) to the private members owners, 
a share of sellable commercial surface (SCV) within the urban redevelopment 
program. Private members must assign the marketing of the SCV directly to 
the company, unless they directly maintain ownership. 
It is in relation to the SCV that one can understand the private interest in 
participating in the urban redevelopment project and taking on the marketing 
risk – through fractioned direct sales or a lump sale – of the surfaces to be 
built. 
The Municipality of Parma, through the establishment of the UTC, also 
seems to have obtained important advantages, among which, the technical 
knowledge and expertise existing within the UTC and the development of 
operative mechanisms for programming, monitoring and controlling the en-
tire urban redevelopment process. 
The economic-financial balance is guaranteed by the project’s profitability 
(the profits obtained from marketing activity) and to a lesser extent, by the 
public investments (Table 11). 
Substantially, the total and final economic value of the real estate property 
that will be created/redeveloped seems to compensate the envisaged urbani-
zation costs. In turn, the urbanization works will contribute significantly to 
the real estate value of the new property. In order for this cycle to be fully 
complete, it is important to empower a UTC with decision-making auton-
omy to program phases and time frames for the initiative, having as its objec-
tive the complete implementation of the works and not the specific interests 
of  the  partners.  Although  there  are  some  management  problems,  typical 
problem of a public-private partnership with the public body as the “pre-
dominant” body, STU Pasubio seems to have the necessary characteristics. 
 
6.    Conclusions 
 
The paper analyses urban transformation companies - a new type of public-
private collaboration for the development and redevelopment of the territory 22    S. POGGESI 
 
– in order to understand the relationship between public and private bodies 
and the advantages and disadvantages deriving from their experience. In par-
ticular the urban transformation company seems to be able to satisfy the pub-
lic and private needs, because of the relationship that there is between urban 
regeneration projects and projects for real estate and commercial develop-
ment. Two aspects must be underlined in conclusion: 
 
1.  the (need for) specification, on the part of the Legislator, of the mixed na-
ture of the companies; through this company structure the legislator de-
fined an effective operative tool capable of carrying out complex activities 
with a significant economic-social importance, an action that is incom-
patible with the local body’s traditional administrative structure.   
2.  the scant existence of this tool in Italy: the six UTCs analyzed represent 
almost the totality of those actually operating within the country. This is 
quite disappointing considering that the law that envisaged UTCs estab-
lishment was passed 10 years ago. Various different causes account for 
this, among which an insufficient knowledge of this tool at national level 
as well as of its economic-social benefits; limited legislation which is often 
extremely  damaging  and  an  inadequate  knowledge  of  business  culture 
within local bodies. It seems useful to dwell upon this point: in three UTS 
out of six, we do not find mixed companies but companies totally con-
trolled by Municipalities. Like in other public context (Poggesi, 2006), lo-
cal authorities seem to fear “loss of control”. This is linked to the scarce 
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Table 1: Modes of governance 
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Table 2: The phases of urban regeneration 
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Table 4: Bid announcements: percentage variations (2002-2005) 
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Table 5: Number of sales (absolute values) 
 
  Residential  Services  Commercial  Productive  Warehouses  Other  Total 
2000  690.476  14.213  49065  13.098  93.459  545.455  1.405.765 
2001  681.266  17.214  47556  14.191  95.501  566.332  1.422.059 
2002  761.520  28.879  59544  19.285  114.407  641.317  1.624.952 
2003  762.086  18.507  51059  14.381  113.201  647.777  1.607.012 
2004  804.126  20.569  54309  16.034  118.57  703.629  1.717.241 
2005  833.350  21.990  55.035  17.343  121.608  756.431  1.805.758 
Source: Elaborated by Ance on data from the Agenzia del Territorio   
 
 
Table 6: Number of sales (relative values) 
 
  Residential  Services  Commercial  Productive  Warehouses  Other  Total 
2001  -1,3  21,1  -3,1  8,3  2,2  3,8  1,2 
2002  11,8  67,8  25,2  35,9  19,8  13,2  14,3 
2003  0,1  -35,9  -14,2  -25,4  -1,1  1,0  -1,1 
2004  5,5  11,1  6,4  11,5  4,7  8,6  6,9 
2005  3,6  6,9  1,3  8,2  2,6  7,5  5,2 
Source: Elaborated by Ance on data from the Agenzia del Territorio 
 
 
Table 7: Sales trend in the residential sector from 1985 to 2005 
 
 Source: our elaboration from data of the Agenzia del Territorio, 2005 32    S. POGGESI 
 
Table 8: Annual variations (%) of real estate prices in 13 urban areas 
 










Homes  5,5  7,1  8,1  7,9  5,1 
Offices  4,3  6,1  6,5  6,1  4,5 
Stores  5,4  5,4  5,8  6,7  4,3 
 Source: Nomisma, 2006 
 
 
Table 9: Interview results 
 




Bagnolifutura Spa di Napoli  No  No 
Città Giovani e Innovazione Spa  No  No 
Pianoro Centro Spa  Sì  No 
Via Nuova Trento Spa   Sì  Sì 
Osservanza S.r.l  Sì  No 
Stu Pasubio  No  Sì 
 
 
Table 10: The formation of the corporate capital in this field of research 
 
    Corporate capital composition 








No private partner  Osservanza 
Città dei Giovani 
Bagnolifutura 
   
Private body is 
chosen through a 
public bid  






Private body is not 
chosen through a 
public bid 
  Pasubio   
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Table 11: Costs and profits for the STU Pasubio 
 
  STU PASUBIO 
Revenue (hypothesis)  130-145 mln € (*) 
-  from selling  93% 
-  from public founds  7% 
   
Costs (hypothesis)  110-125 mln € (*) 
-  Constructions  60% 
•  Public urbanization  15% 
•  Private “buildings”  45% 
-  To buy areas  25% 
-  To project and other  15% 
 (*) approximate values 
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